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Abstract
Prophet inequalities compare the expected performance of an online algorithm for a stochas-
tic optimization problem to the expected optimal solution in hindsight. They are a major
alternative to classic worst-case competitive analysis, of particular importance in the design and
analysis of simple (posted-price) incentive compatible mechanisms with provable approximation
guarantees.
A central open problem in this area concerns subadditive combinatorial auctions. Here n
agents with subadditive valuation functions compete for the assignment of m items. The goal is
to find an allocation of the items that maximizes the total value of the assignment. The question
is whether there exists a prophet inequality for this problem that significantly beats the best
known approximation factor of O(logm).
We make major progress on this question by providing an O(log logm) prophet inequality.
Our proof goes through a novel primal-dual approach. It is also constructive, resulting in an
online policy that takes the form of static and anonymous item prices that can be computed
in polynomial time given appropriate query access to the valuations. As an application of our
approach, we construct a simple and incentive compatible mechanism based on posted prices
that achieves an O(log logm) approximation to the optimal revenue for subadditive valuations
under an item-independence assumption.
1 Introduction
We study the following online stochastic allocation problem. There is a set M of m objects to
be divided among n agents. Each agent has a valuation function that assigns a value to every
subset of objects. These valuation functions are random, drawn independently from known (but
not necessarily identical) distributions. Agents arrive one by one in an arbitrary order and when
an agent arrives her valuation is revealed. The decision-maker must choose which subset of objects
to give each agent when she arrives. The goal is to maximize the total value of the assignment.
The special case of a single object is precisely the setup of the famous prophet inequality due
to Krengel, Sucheston, and Samuel-Cahn [25, 26, 32]. They show that there exists an online policy
whose expected value is at least half of the expected optimal solution in hindsight, which in this
case is simply the expected maximum value held by any agent for the object. The policy also has a
surprisingly simple form: allocate to the first agent whose value exceeds a fixed threshold calculated
in advance from the known distributions. Interest in prophet inequalities has surged recently, in
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part due to applications in pricing and auction design driven by the observation that the fixed
threshold can be viewed as a posted price. This has lead to a line of literature studying prophet
inequalities for more general instances of the allocation problem, yielding approximately-optimal
online policies and incentive compatible auctions for increasingly general problem instances with
many objects and rich classes of valuation functions (e.g., [7, 24, 20, 16, 21, 29, 30, 14, 10]).
One of the more vexing open problems in this space concerns subadditive valuations. A valuation
function v is subadditive if v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ) for all sets of objects S and T . This captures
the property that items are not complementary, in the sense that objects are not more valuable
together than they are apart. This is a natural and important property in many contexts, and the
subadditive allocation problem has thus received considerable attention from both the algorithmic
and economic perspectives. For the former, there is a known O(1)-approximate polynomial-time
algorithm for the offline problem [18]. For the latter, it is known that running a sealed-bid auction
for each object separately yields an O(1) approximation to the optimal welfare at any Bayes-Nash
equilibrium [19]. But despite these results, the best-known prophet inequality bound is O(logm)
[20]. Correspondingly, the best known incentive compatible mechanisms for Bayesian subadditive
combinatorial auctions achieve O(logm) approximations to the expected welfare or revenue [20, 5].
This leaves us with a significant asymptotic gap in the known power of truthful versus non-truthful
mechanisms, and closing it is a central open challenge.
We make substantial progress on this problem by obtaining anO(log logm)-approximate prophet
inequality for subadditive valuations. The policy we construct is threshold-based: the designer con-
structs static and anonymous prices for the objects, and each agent is assigned the set of objects
(from among those that remain) that maximizes her value minus the posted prices. The analysis
is constructive, and the appropriate prices can be computed in polynomial time given access to
demand queries for the valuations.1 This prophet inequality directly implies a polynomial-time
incentive compatible posted-price mechanism for subadditive combinatorial auctions that achieves
an O(log logm) approximation to the expected optimal welfare.
Our construction can also be applied to the problem of constructing simple and approximately
revenue-optimal mechanisms. A recent line of work has studied the power of simple posted-price-
based mechanisms to approximate optimal revenue in auctions with multiple items. Recently, Cai
and Zhao [5] showed that under an item-independence assumption, it is possible to obtain an
O(logm) approximation for subadditive valuations using a posted-price mechanism with either (a)
an up-front entry fee for each agent, or (b) a restriction on the number of objects each agent can
buy. We show that a modification of our prophet inequality can be used to obtain an improved
O(log logm) approximation, using the same two classes of mechanisms.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
An O(log log m) Prophet Inequality. Our first result is an existential O(log logm)-approximate
price-based prophet inequality for subadditive combinatorial auctions. The pricing interpretation is
that we are given access to distributions Di over subadditive valuation functions vi, we will precom-
pute item prices pj for each item j ∈M , and then agents will arrive one-by-one, each with valuation
vi drawn from Di, and buy a subset of items S that maximizes their utility vi(S) −∑j∈S pj. Our
result is that we can find prices so that the expected welfare of the resulting allocation will be an
O(log logm) approximation to the expected welfare that could be achieved by an optimal offline
algorithm with advance knowledge of all valuations.
1Given a valuation function v, a set of objects M , and a price pj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ M , a demand query returns the
set S that maximizes v(S)−
∑
j∈S
pj .
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Theorem 1.1 (Welfare, Existential). For subadditive valuations drawn independently from known
distributions, there exist static anonymous item prices that yield a O(log logm) approximation to
the optimal expected welfare.
We prove the theorem for complete information (known valuations), and then extend it to the
Bayesian case with incomplete information. At the heart of our approach is the following lemma,
which for a given and fixed subbaditive valuation vi asserts the existence of item prices pj for a
given set U that satisfy a certain inequality.
Lemma 1.1 (Key Lemma). For every i ∈ N , subadditive function vi, and set U ⊆ M there exist
prices pj for j ∈ U and a probability distribution λ over S ⊆ U such that for all T ⊆ U
∑
S⊆U
λS

vi(S \ T )−∑
j∈S
pj

 ≥ vi(U)
α
−
∑
j∈T
pj ,
where α ∈ O(log logm).
Given this lemma it is relatively straightforward to show Theorem 1.1. The idea is to let
(U1, . . . , Un) be the welfare-maximizing allocation, and for each Ui and j ∈ Ui use the prices pj
from Lemma 1.1 with U = Ui. The welfare argument then proceeds by rewriting the welfare as
the sum of buyer utilities and revenue, with Lemma 1.1 providing a tool to lower bound the buyer
utilities.
In this lower bound argument the set T from Lemma 1.1 can be interpreted as the set of items
which are already gone when we consider agent i, and λ is a distribution over sets of items S that
agent i considers to buy. Of course, agent i can only buy items that are still available, so she only
derives value from S \ T . The lemma therefore establishes that the utility that can be obtained by
agent i is at least a factor α of her contribution to the optimal welfare, less the revenue obtained
from selling the items from T .
To prove Lemma 1.1 we write down an LP and use strong LP duality to show the following
equivalent condition: There exists a probability distribution λ over set of items S so that for every
probability distribution µ with
∑
T :j∈T µT ≤
∑
S:j∈S λS , i.e., that puts at most the same probability
mass on each item j as distribution λ, it holds that
∑
S,T
λS · µT · vi(S \ T ) ≥ 1
α
· vi(U). (1)
We interpret the left-hand side as a zero-sum game, in which the protagonist chooses λ and
the antagonist chooses µ, and the protagonist’s goal is to maximize
∑
S,T λS · µT · vi(S \ T ). This
has a natural interpretation: the designer’s goal is to find a purchasing strategy for the buyer that
maximizes the value of the set they obtain, and the adversary’s goal is to arrange the purchasing
outcomes so that removing all previously-sold items (i.e., T ) steals most of the value from the
buyer, leaving their realized value vi(S \ T ) as small as possible.
We prove a lower bound on the value of this game by restricting attention to distributions λ
that put the same probability mass q on each item. The crux of our argument is that for each such
“equal-marginals distribution” λ with corresponding probability q, the value of the zero-sum game
is at least f(q)− f(q2), where f(q) is the optimal expected social welfare that can be achieved by a
distribution over sets of items S ⊆ U that puts probability mass at most q on each item. Intuitively,
if it’s possible for the adversary to choose some distribution µ over T that is guaranteed to “steal
the value” from the buyer’s distribution λ over S, then it must be that the set S ∩ T has high
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expected value. But if λ and µ each place probability at most q on each item, then the distribution
over S ∩ T places probability at most q2 on each item. Thus, if the adversary can perform well
in the zero-sum game for some q, this directly implies that we should consider the game with the
significantly smaller marginal probability q2.
To turn this intuition into an O(log logm) bound, we let the protagonist consider such “equal
marginal distributions” for q = 2−2
k
for k = 0 to k = O(log logm), and obtain a lower bound
on the value of the zero-sum game by taking the average of the sum of the corresponding lower
bounds f(q)− f(q2). Now by the choice of the q this sum has O(log logm) terms, and the sum is
a telescoping sum which evaluates to f(1/2)− f(1/m2). The proof is completed by observing that
the latter is at least (1/2 − o(1)) · vi(U).
Polynomial-Time Computation of Prices. Our second result shows how to turn this exis-
tential proof into a polytime result, assuming appropriate demand query access to the valuation
functions.
Theorem 1.2 (Welfare, Computational). For subadditive combinatorial valuations drawn indepen-
dently from known distributions and any ǫ > 0, there is a polytime (in n, m, and 1/ǫ) algorithm to
compute static and anonymous item prices for which the resulting posted-price mechanism achieves
an O(log logm) approximation to the optimal expected welfare up to an additive error of ǫ.
We prove this theorem by reformulating our optimization problem in a way that avoids having to
compute the equilibrium distributions in our zero-sum game, and instead draws a connection to the
classic configuration LP for combinatorial assignment. We then use the fact that the configuration
LP can be solved in polynomial time using the Ellipsoid method, since a separation oracle can be
implemented with demand queries.
Specifically, we draw q uniformly from the set of q’s introduced above. For the resulting q we
consider the dual LP to the configuration LP for f(q2) — the optimal welfare that can be achieved
with a probability distribution that puts probability mass at most q2 on each item—and we use
the prices from this dual LP scaled by q.
The intuition behind this construction is as follows. In our argument above we bounded the
value of the zero-sum game by f(q) − f(q2). Here f(q) is the highest expected value that the
protagonist could obtain from a choice of λ if the adversary abstained, and f(q2) is an upper bound
on how much value the antagonist can take away by choosing µ optimally. By taking the dual
prices for the configuration LP for f(q2) and scaling them by q, we are effectively setting prices
that approximate the welfare loss due to the antagonist’s strategy, which is to say the worst-case
loss from excluding items that have already been sold.
Revenue Maximization. We also show how to leverage our new insights to make progress on
another important frontier in algorithmic mechanism design. Namely, the question of how well
the optimal revenue that can be obtained by a Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanism
can be approximated by a simple and dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanism.
Our revenue approximation makes use of a framework for constructing simple mechanisms due to
Cai and Zhao [5], which builds upon a recent literature applying a duality approach to revenue
maximization [4]. Cai and Zhao established an O(logm) approximation under a natural item
independence assumption. Under the same assumption we show:
Theorem 1.3 (Revenue). When buyers have subadditive valuations over independent items, there
is a simple DSIC mechanism that yields an O(log logm) approximation to the optimal BIC revenue.
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A key step in the proof of Cai and Zhao [5] invokes a posted-price-based prophet inequality for
welfare maximization, and indeed their approximation factor of O(logm) is driven by the O(logm)-
approximate prophet inequality that they apply. However, one cannot apply a prophet inequality to
their framework as a black box. The reason is that the prophet inequality is invoked to argue that
the value of a certain interim allocation rule—the core of a revenue-optimal mechanism—can be
approximated by posted prices. We obtain the improved bound by extending our prophet inequality
so that it can handle arbitrary (not necessarily equal) constraints on the marginal probability of
allocating each item, and using this to obtain a better price-based approximation to the core.
Going Beyond O(log log m). Finally, we demonstrate that the O(log logm)-factor that shows
up in all our bounds is best possible using our approach. In particular, our analysis restricts to
distributions that set the same marginal probability q of allocating each item. We show by way
of example that such distributions (and their associated dual prices) can suffer loss as high as
Ω(log logm).
Theorem 1.4 (Lower Bound). There exists a subadditive valuation function vi over m items such
that for any q ∈ [0, 1], any α ∈ o(log logm), and any distribution λ that puts probability at most q
on each item there exists a distribution µ that puts probability at most q on each item that violates
inequality (1).
Our restriction to equal-marginal distributions was crucial for our approach to optimizing over
distributions. Of course, it is natural to wonder whether our bound could be improved by relaxing
the equal-marginals assumption and permitting an arbitrary profile of marginal distributions. In-
deed, we conjecture that an O(1)-approximate prophet inequality can be achieved using item prices
that are dual to a distribution with unequal marginals. But we leave resolving this conjecture as
an open problem.
Discussion: Connection to Balanced Prices. The main difference between our O(log logm)
approximation and the earlier state-of-the-art O(logm) prophet inequality from [20] is that this
earlier approach constructed prices by approximating subadditive valuations through fractionally
subadditive (a.k.a. XOS) functions. This leads to “balanced prices” in the sense of [14], where the
sum of all prices matches the optimal allocation precisely.
More generally, the balanced prices framework of [14] entails constructing prices for any fixed
valuation profile, such that (a) the prices of any subset of items partially offset the value lost
due to allocating these items, and (b) the sum of all prices is upper bounded by the total value
of the optimal allocation of all items. With parameters 1/α and β for (a) and (b) this leads to
O(1/(αβ)) price-based prophet inequalities. However, such balanced prices cannot lead to a better
than O(logm) approximation for subadditive combinatorial auctions [20].
Our prices are different, and will generally be much higher. The basic intuition is that, under
balanced prices, the sum of all prices approximates the optimal welfare, so in a sense the set of all
items is “affordable” and the prices facilitate an outcome where most of the items are purchased.
However, depending on the curvature of the subadditive valuations, it may be better to target
much smaller sets for purchase if they already capture most of the value. By looking at different
marginals q we are basically considering different sizes q ·m of sets of items to go after, and our
key lemma establishes that there is always a good choice of q. As q becomes smaller, the prices
we construct are tailored to facilitate purchases of smaller sets of items, and hence the item prices
tend to increase.
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1.2 Further related work
From a purely algorithmic perspective social welfare with fractionally subadditive (or XOS) and
subadditive valuations can be approximated to within a constant factor assuming demand queries.
The state-of-the-art for both XOS and subadditive valuations is a 1 − 1/e approximation due to
[18]. These approximation guarantees are best possible in the sense that they match the integrality
gap of the LP formulations they are based on.
An important question in algorithmic mechanism design concerns the gap between the best
(worst-case) approximation guarantee that can be obtained without incentives (i.e., purely algo-
rithmically) and with a truthful mechanism. Recent breakthroughs for submodular (a subclass of
XOS) valuations were obtained by Dobzinski [13], who gave a O(
√
logm) truthful approximation
mechanism for submodular valuations and by Assadi and Singla [1] who gave a O((log logm)3)
truthful approximation mechanism for XOS valuations. Finding DSIC approximation mechanisms
with constant worst-case approximation guarantees for either XOS or subadditive valuations or
disproving their existence is a major open problem.
A related question concerns the relative power of truthful direct-revelation mechanisms and gen-
eral mechanisms at equilibrium. The latter can be analyzed using the price of anarchy framework,
in which the expected optimal solution is compared with the worst-case expected outcome at any
Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. Christodoulou, Kovacs, and Schapira [11] established
an O(1) price of anarchy bound for simultaneous item auctions for XOS valuations, which was sub-
sequently extended to a variety of auction formats and related solution concepts [33]. In particular,
Feldman, Fu, Gravin, and Lucier [19] established an O(1) price of anarchy for simultaneous item
auctions under subadditive valuations.
Prophet inequalities for XOS and subadditive combinatorial auctions in which agents arrive
one by one were previously given in [20, 14] and [17]. For XOS valuations an optimal factor 2 is
shown in [20, 14], and this can be improved to 1 − 1/e by additionally assuming agents arrive in
random order [17]. For subadditive valuations, Feldman et al. [20] give an O(logm) approximation.
Rubinstein and Singla [30] consider a related but different problem, where there is one subadditive
function across all entities that arrive over time. They give an O(logm log2 r) prophet inequality,
where r is the rank of an arbitrary downward closed feasibility constraint.
In concurrent and independent work, [36] was able to improve the O(logm) prophet inequality
for subadditive combinatorial auctions to O(logm/ log logm). This marks an important break-
through as it shows that it is possible to improve upon the O(logm) bound.
Our application to revenue maximization builds upon a recent literature on approximately
revenue-optimal mechanisms for buyers with multi-dimensional types. For unit-demand buyers,
one can obtain a constant approximation to the optimal mechanism with multiple buyers [6, 7, 8].
Simple constant approximations are known for additive buyers with independent valuations, using
a technique known as a tail-core decomposition which bounds separately the revenue contribution
from rare outlier values and from “expected” valuation profiles [23, 27, 2, 35]. Chawla and Miller
showed how to combine both approaches to develop a general class of approximately optimal mech-
anisms based on posted prices with per-buyer entry fees [9]. Cai, Devanur, and Weinberg further
unify these approaches using a flexible duality framework to effectively “linearize” valuations with
respect to revenue [4]. The ideas behind these mechanisms have since been extended to more
general valuation classes, including XOS and subadditive valuations [5, 31]. Most related to the
current paper is the work of Cai and Zhang [5], which (among other things) uses this framework
to design an O(logm)-approximate mechanism for subadditive valuations, based on posted item
prices with per-buyer entry fees.
6
2 Model and Definitions
Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions. We are given a set N of n buyers and a set M of
m goods. Each buyer i ∈ N has a valuation function vi : 2M → R≥0, which is assumed to be
normalized and monotone, i.e., vi(∅) = 0 and vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) for S ⊆ T ⊆M . A valuation function
vi is subadditive if
vi(S) + vi(T ) ≥ vi(S ∪ T ) for S, T ⊆M.
We use v = (v1, . . . , vn) to denote a vector of valuation functions. We will occasionally write
v = (vi,v−i), where we use v−i to denote the valuations of all buyers except buyer i.
We assume a Bayesian setting, in which the valuation function of each buyer i is drawn indepen-
dently from distribution Di. We write D =
∏
iDi for the joint distribution. We emphasize that the
independence here is across bidders. Valuations of a fixed agent can be arbitrarily correlated across
items (though we revisit this when discussing applications to revenue maximization in Section 5).
We assume that the designer knows the distributions from which the valuation functions are drawn,
but not the realizations of the random draws.
An allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) defines for each buyer i ∈ N a set of goods xi ⊆ M that he
receives. We require that no good is assigned more than once, i.e., that xi∩xj = ∅ whenever i 6= j.
We write x<i for partial allocations to buyers s < i, i.e., for t ≥ i we have xt = ∅.
We evaluate allocations by the welfare they achieve. The welfare of an allocation x is
∑
i vi(xi).
We write OPT(v) for the welfare-maximizing allocation, and v(OPT((v)) =
∑n
i=1 vi(OPTi(v)) for
the welfare it achieves.
Posted-Price Mechanisms. A posted-price mechanism uses a set of functions pi(· | x<i) : 2M →
R≥0 which assign a non-negative price to each set of items S ⊆M . Note that these functions can
be personalized, they can be “per set” rather than “per item” (i.e., the price of a set of items need
not be a sum of prices of individual items), and they may depend on which items were already
allocated.
Of particular interest will be posted-price mechanisms that use static anonymous item prices. A
posted-price mechanism has anonymous prices if there exists a single set of functions p(· | x<i) such
that pi(S | x<i) = p(S | x<i) for all i, S, and x<i. It uses item prices if pi(S | x<i) =∑j∈S pi({j} |
x<i) for all i, S, and x<i. Finally, prices are static if for each i there is a single function pi(·) such
that pi(S | x<i) = pi(S) for all S and x<i.
An important advantage of posted-price mechanism with static anonymous item prices is that
they can be succinctly described by a single vector p = (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ Rm≥0.
A posted-price mechanism proceeds as follows. The buyers arrive sequentially, and for notational
convenience we assume they are indexed according to their arrival order.2 Upon arrival of buyer i
the mechanism posts a price pi(S,x<i) for each set of items S. Buyer i buys any set of items xi
that maximizes her utility ui(xi,p) = vi(xi)−∑j∈xi pj among all such sets.
Given a fixed choice of item prices, we will tend to write ALG for the corresponding posted-
price mechanism, ALG(v) for the resulting allocation of items when valuations are v, and use
v(ALG(v)) =
∑n
i=1 vi(ALGi(v)) to denote the welfare it achieves.
Prophet Inequalities. We will follow the “prophet-inequality paradigm” to evaluate the per-
formance of posted-price mechanisms. That is, we will evaluate the performance of a posted-price
mechanism ALG by comparing its expected welfare Ev∼D [v(ALG(v))] to the expected optimal
2All of our results continue to hold in a more general setting where the arrival order is arbitrary and unknown to
the designer (but still fixed in advance) and is revealed online as the buyers arrive.
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welfare Ev∼D [v(OPT(v))]. Extending the notion of competitive ratio from the worst-case analysis
of online algorithms, we define the (stochastic) competitive ratio of a posted-price mechanism as
sup
D
Ev∼D [v(OPT(v))]
Ev∼D [v(ALG(v))]
.
3 An O(log logm) Price-Based Prophet Inequality for Welfare
We start by establishing the existence of an O(log logm)-competitive price-based prophet inequality
for subadditive combinatorial auctions and the goal of maximizing welfare.
Theorem 3.1. For subadditive combinatorial auctions there is a O(log logm)-competitive posted-
price mechanism that uses static anonymous item prices.
It suffices to show Theorem 3.1 for m > 2 as for m = O(1) the competitive ratio is constant. We
will prove the theorem in two steps. In Section 3.1, we show the claim for complete information.
That is, we assume valuations are fixed and known. In Section 3.2, we prove it for the Bayesian
case with incomplete information.
3.1 Proof for Complete Information
Our key lemma and driver of the improved competitive ratio is the following lemma. We prove
this lemma using LP-duality, and derive the existence of appropriate prices and the corresponding
probability distribution over sets of items through a zero-sum game formulation. Lemma 3.1 is a
restatement of Lemma 1.1 from the introduction. Recalling the discussion after Lemma 1.1, the
intuition is that the revenue raised by selling items that would typically be allocated to buyer i
(set T ), plus the utility that buyer i can obtain from the remaining items (by buying set S\T ),
approximates buyer i’s contribution to the expected optimal welfare (i.e., vi(U)).
Lemma 3.1. For every i ∈ N , subadditive function vi, and set U ⊆ M there exist prices pj for
j ∈ U and a probability distribution λ over S ⊆ U such that for all T ⊆ U
∑
j∈T
pj +
∑
S⊆U
λS

vi(S \ T )−∑
j∈S
pj

 ≥ vi(U)
α
,
where α ∈ O(log logm).
Before we prove Lemma 3.1, let’s see how it implies the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (complete information). Let OPT(v) = (U1, . . . , Un) be the welfare-maximizing
allocation for valuations v. Define a vector p of item prices as follows: For i ∈ N and j ∈ Ui use price
pj from Lemma 3.1. Let ALG be the posted-price mechanism that uses prices p. Denote the allo-
cation of ALG on valuation profile v by ALG1(v), . . . ,ALGn(v) and let SOLD(v) = ∪ni=1ALGi(v)
denote the set of items sold by the mechanism.
To derive a lower bound on the welfare achieved by the posted-price mechanism we will use
that the welfare can be decomposed into utility and revenue. Namely, if we write ui((vi,v−i),p)
for the utility of buyer i and r(v,p) for the revenue, then
v(ALG(v)) =
n∑
i=1
ui((vi,v−i),p) + r(v,p).
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We begin by deriving a lower bound on the sum of the utilities. To this end consider an arbitrary
buyer i. Let λ be the probability distribution over sets of items S ⊆ Ui from Lemma 3.1 and let
T = ∪ℓ<iALG(v)ℓ ∩ Ui ⊆ SOLD(v) ∩ Ui. Now because buyer i could draw a set of items S from λ
and buy set S \ T (or no set at all if this gives her negative utility),
ui((vi,v−i),p) ≥
∑
S⊆Ui
λS

vi(S \ T )−∑
j∈S
pj

 ≥ vi(Ui)
α
−
∑
j∈T
pj ,
where the inequality holds by Lemma 3.1.
Summing over all buyers i, we obtain
n∑
i=1
ui((vi,v−i),p) ≥ v(OPT(v))
α
−
∑
j∈SOLD(v)
pj. (2)
On the other hand, the revenue obtained by the posted-price mechanism is
r(v,p) =
∑
j∈SOLD(v)
pj. (3)
Adding (2) and (3) shows the claim.
To prove Lemma 3.1 we will write down an LP that captures the claim. The lemma statement
will be satisfied whenever the optimal solution to the LP has non-negative value, and we will show
that this is indeed the case using strong duality.
Consider an arbitrary buyer i and an arbitrary set U . Let γ = 1/α. In order to establish
Lemma 3.1, we have to show that there are prices pj for j ∈ U and a distribution λ over sets of
items S ⊆ U such that for all T ⊆ U
∑
j∈T
pj +
∑
S⊆U
λS

vi(S \ T )−∑
j∈S
pj

 ≥ γvi(U).
or equivalently ∑
S⊆U
λS
∑
j∈S
pj −
∑
j∈T
pj ≤
∑
S⊆U
λSvi(S \ T )− γvi(U). (4)
To show inequality (4), we will consider the following LP. The LP is for a fixed λ and has
variables pj ≥ 0 for j ∈ U and two more variables ℓ+ ≥ 0 and ℓ− ≥ 0. The extra variables model
a slack term ℓ+ − ℓ− of arbitrary sign which we consider adding to the the left-hand side of the
inequality. The LP maximizes the slack term.
max ℓ+ − ℓ−
s.t.
∑
S⊆U
λS
∑
j∈S
pj −
∑
j∈T
pj + (ℓ+ − ℓ−) ≤
∑
S⊆U
λSvi(S \ T )− γvi(U) for all T ⊆ U
pj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ U
ℓ+ ≥ 0
ℓ− ≥ 0.
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As a non-negative slack means that inequality (4) is fulfilled, we know that there are prices
fulfilling inequality (4) if and only if this LP has an optimal solution with non-negative objective
value.
Our strategy for showing this will be to go through the dual. Indeed by strong duality it is
equivalent to show that every feasible solution to the following dual LP with variables µT ≥ 0 for
T ⊆ U has non-negative value.
min
∑
T
µT

∑
S⊆U
λSvi(S \ T )− γvi(U)


s.t. −
∑
T :j∈T
µT +
∑
T
∑
S:j∈S
λSµT ≥ 0 for all j ∈ U
∑
T
µT = 1
µT ≥ 0 for all T ⊆ U .
We note that the dual constraints are equivalent to
∑
T µT = 1 and
∑
T :j∈T µT ≤
∑
S:j∈S λS for
all j ∈ U . So they naturally define probability distributions over sets of items T ⊆ U , which can
put at most the same probability mass on each item j ∈ U as the probability distribution λ.
This means that the LP has non-negative value if and only if for every probability distribution
µ with
∑
T :j∈T µT ≤
∑
S:j∈S λS it holds that∑
S,T
λSµT vi(S \ T ) ≥ γvi(U). (5)
We can now formulate the search for an appropriate λ as a zero-sum game in which pure
strategies correspond to subsets of items. The maximizing player chooses S, the minimizing player
chooses T , and the payoff associated with two sets S and T is vi(S \T ). We want to show that there
is mixed strategy λ for the maximizing player such that when the minimizing player is constrained
to use a mixed strategy µ which puts at most the same probability mass on each item j as λ, then
the value of the game is at least γvi(U).
To this end let q = (q1, . . . , q|U |) where qj ∈ [0, 1] and let ∆(q) denote all probability distribu-
tions ν over sets S ⊆ U such that ∑T∋j νT ≤ qj for all j. Define
g(q) = max
λ∈∆(q)
min
µ∈∆(q)
∑
S,T⊆U
λSµT vi(S \ T ). (6)
Inequality (5) and hence inequality (4) and Lemma 3.1 are therefore equivalent to there being
a q such that g(q) ≥ vi(U)/O(log logm).
The following lemma shows that it is in fact possible to achieve this with a uniform vector q in
which qi = qj for all i and j.
Lemma 3.2. There exists a q ∈ [0, 1] such that for q = (q, . . . , q) ∈ [0, 1]|U | we have
g(q) ≥ 1
O(log logm)
vi(U).
Proof. For q ∈ [0, 1] define
g(q) = max
λ∈∆(q,...,q)
min
µ∈∆(q,...,q)
∑
S,T⊆U
λSµT vi(S \ T ), and
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f(q) = max
λ∈∆(q,...,q)
∑
S⊆U
λSvi(S).
We now use subadditivity, that
∑
T µT = 1, and finally that µTλS defines a probability distri-
bution on S ∩ T that puts at most probability mass q2 on each item to obtain
g(q) = max
λ∈∆(q,...,q)
min
µ∈∆(q,...,q)
∑
S,T⊆U
λSµT vi(S \ T )
≥ max
λ∈∆(q,...,q)
min
µ∈∆(q,...,q)
∑
S,T⊆U
λSµT
(
vi(S)− vi(S ∩ T )
)
= max
λ∈∆(q,...,q)
( ∑
S⊆U
λSvi(S)− max
µ∈∆(q,...,q)
∑
S,T⊆U
λSµT vi(S ∩ T )
)
≥ max
λ∈∆(q,...,q)
( ∑
S⊆U
λSvi(S)− max
ν∈∆(q2,...,q2)
∑
S⊆U
νSvi(S)
)
= f(q)− f(q2),
For any ℓ we thus have,
ℓ∑
i=0
g(2−2
i
) ≥
ℓ∑
i=0
(
f
(
2−2
i
)
− f
(
2−2
i+1
))
= f(2−1)− f(2−2ℓ+1),
by a telescoping sum argument.
With ℓ = log logm,
2−2
ℓ+1
= 2−2 logm =
1
m2
.
Hence for ℓ = log logm,
ℓ∑
i=0
g(2−2
i
) ≥ f
(1
2
)
− f
( 1
m2
)
.
We conclude the proof by showing a lower bound on f(1/2) and an upper bound on f(1/m2).
A lower bound on f(1/2) follows from the fact that λ could take the set Ui with probability 1/2.
So
f
(
1
2
)
≥ 1
2
· vi(U).
For the upper bound on f(1/m2) we exploit the trivial upper bound on vi(S) namely vi(U). Using
this we obtain,
f
(
1
m2
)
= max
λ∈∆(1/m2,...,1/m2)
∑
S⊆U
λSvi(S)
≤ max
λ∈∆(1/m2,...,1/m2)

 ∑
S⊆U,S 6=∅
λS

 vi(U)
≤
∑
j∈U

 ∑
S:S∋j
λS

 vi(U)
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≤ m · 1
m2
· vi(U)
=
1
m
· vi(U).
We conclude that
max
q
g(q) ≥ 1
ℓ+ 1
ℓ∑
i=0
g(2−2
i
) ≥ 1
ℓ+ 1
(
1
2
− 1
m
)
vi(U),
as claimed.
3.2 Proof for Incomplete Information
We next show how to extend our arguments to the incomplete information case, where the valuations
are not fixed and known but rather are drawn from known distributions. Our proof is based on the
following variant of Lemma 3.1. The proof of this lemma in Appendix A follows the same basic
steps as the proof of Lemma 3.1, but requires some additional care when deriving a lower bound
on the value of the zero-sum game. In particular, since the zero-sum game now has payoffs that
are defined with respect to the distribution over valuations, our argument requires that we relate
the value of the game to the expected value of the distribution over full-information games.
Lemma 3.3. For every probability distribution D = ∏iDi over subadditive valuation functions,
there exist prices pj for j ∈ M and probability distributions λi,v over S ⊆ M for all i and v such
that for all T ⊆M
∑
j∈T
pj + Ev

 n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS

vi(S \ T )−∑
j∈S
pj



 ≥ 1
α
Ev [v(OPT(v))] ,
where α ∈ O(log logm).
Using Lemma 3.3 it is straightforward to prove Theorem 3.1 using a hallucination trick similar to
that in the price of anarchy literature [33, 28], the literature on algorithmic stability [22], and in the
balanced prices framework for prophet inequalities [14]. We provide a formal proof in Appendix B
for completeness.
4 Computing Prices in Polynomial Time
Theorem 3.1 shows the existence of static anonymous item prices that yield an O(log logm) approx-
imation to the optimal welfare. In this section, we establish the following computational version of
this result. It shows how to achieve the same approximation guarantee in polynomial time. The
proof also reveals an alternative for choosing prices that yield an O(log logm) approximation. We
assume to have access to demand oracles for the valuation functions in the support of D. Recall
that a demand oracle for valuation function vi takes as input item prices p1, . . . , pm and returns
the set S ⊆M that maximizes vi(S)−
∑
j∈S pj.
Theorem 4.1. For subadditive combinatorial auctions and any ǫ > 0, there is a polynomial-
time (in n, m, and 1/ǫ) algorithm to compute static and anonymous item prices for which the
resulting posted-price mechanism achieves expected welfare at least 1α · Ev [v(OPT(v)] − ǫ where
α = O(log logm).
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Our proof is based on the following version of Lemma 3.3 that includes computations in poly-
nomial time using demand oracles.
Lemma 4.1. For every probability distribution D = ∏iDi over subadditive valuation functions and
every ǫ > 0, there exist prices pj for j ∈M and probability distributions λi,v over S ⊆M for all i
and v such that for all T ⊆M
∑
j∈T
pj + Ev

 n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS

vi(S \ T )−∑
j∈S
pj



 ≥ 1
α
Ev [v(OPT(v))] − ǫ,
where α ∈ O(log logm). Moreover, assuming that v(OPT(v)) ≤ 1 for all v in the support, for any
ζ > 0, there is an algorithm that uses poly(n,m, 1/ǫ, log(1/ζ)) demand oracle queries that computes
such prices with probability at least 1− ζ.
Proof. We will proceed in two steps. First, we will assume to have the ability to compute expecta-
tions Ev [ · ]. Then, in the second step, we simulate this ability by sampling from the distributions
and bound the errors.
Computation of Prices. Fix some valuation profile v. As in the case of complete information,
we will consider an f -function that maximizes the expected value vi(S), where S is drawn from a
constrained distribution over sets of items. To this end, for each q ∈ [0, 1] let Γ(q) = {{νi}ni=1 |∑n
i=1
∑
S:S∋j ν
i
S ≤ q for all j in M} be the collection of distribution profiles for which the marginal
probability that each item is allocated is at most q. Then we will define
fv(q) = sup
λ∈Γ(q)
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λiSvi(S).
Fix q ∈ [0, 1] and let λi,v,q be some choice of λ ∈ Γ(q) that achieves the maximum in the
definition of fv(q).
We now consider the following linear program:
max
n∑
i=1
∑
S
xiSvi(S)
s.t.
∑
i
∑
S:j∈S
xiS ≤ q2 for all j ∈M
∑
S
xiS ≤ 1 for all i
xiS ≥ 0 for all i, S
The value of this program is precisely equal to fv(q2), from the definition of fv. The dual of this
linear program is given by
min
∑
j∈M
q2yj +
n∑
i=1
ui
s.t. ui +
∑
j∈S
yj ≥ vi(S) for all i, S
ui ≥ 0 for all i
yj ≥ 0 for all j
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Let (yv,qj )j∈M , (u
v,q
i )i∈N denote an optimal solution to this dual. We note that this optimal
solution can be computed in polynomial time. Indeed, it suffices to find a separation oracle for
the dual program. A separation oracle query is equivalent to finding a set S that maximizes
vi(S) −∑j∈S yj for a given choice of (yj)j∈M . But this is precisely a demand query, interpreting
the dual variables yj as item prices. Thus, given access to a demand oracle for vi, one can solve
the dual program and compute (yv,qj )j∈M .
Our algorithm now chooses q so as to maximize Ev [fv(q)]−Ev
[
fv(q2)
]
among all q = 2−2
X
for
some X ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ}, where ℓ = log logm. We then define our prices according to pqj = Ev˜
[
qyv˜,qj
]
.
That is, pqj is equal to the expected value of y
v˜,q
j scaled by q.
Approximation Guarantee. To prove the approximation guarantee, we first show a property
of the prices that holds regardless of the choice of q.
Claim 4.1. For any choice of q ∈ [0, 1], the prices defined by pqj = Ev˜
[
qyv˜,qj
]
fulfill
Ev

∑
i,S
λi,v,qS

vi(S \ T )−∑
j∈S
pqj

+∑
j∈T
pqj

 ≥ Ev [fv(q)]− Ev [fv(q2)] .
Proof of Claim 4.1. For all v and T , we have
∑
i,S
λi,v,qS

vi(S \ T )−∑
j∈S
pqj

+∑
j∈T
pqj
≥
∑
i,S
λi,v,qS

vi(S)− vi(S ∩ T )−∑
j∈S
pqj

+∑
j∈T
pqj
=
∑
i,S
λi,v,qS vi(S)−
∑
i,S
λi,v,qS vi(S ∩ T )−
∑
i,S
λi,v,qS
∑
j∈S
pqj +
∑
j∈T
pqj ,
where the inequality uses subadditivity and the equality is simply expansion.
We now analyze each of the terms of this expression. First,
∑
i,S λ
i,v,q
S vi(S) = f
v(q) from
the definition of λi,v,q. Next, since (yv,qj )j∈M , (u
v,q
i )i∈N satisfy the dual program, it must be that
vi(S ∩ T ) ≤ uv,qi +
∑
j∈S∩T y
v,q
j . This implies∑
i,S
λi,v,qS vi(S ∩ T ) ≤
∑
i
uv,qi
∑
S
λi,v,qS +
∑
i,S
λi,v,qS
∑
j∈S∩T
yv,qj ≤
∑
i
uv,qi + q
∑
j∈T
yv,qj .
Furthermore
∑
i,S λ
i,v,q
S
∑
j∈S p
q
j ≤ q
∑
j∈M p
q
j . We therefore conclude
∑
i,S
λi,v,qS

vi(S \ T )−∑
j∈S
pqj

+∑
j∈T
pqj
≥ fv(q)− q
∑
j∈T
yv,qj −
∑
i
uv,qi − q
∑
j∈M
pqj +
∑
j∈T
pqj .
We now take expectations over v to get
Ev

∑
i,S
λi,v,qS

vi(S)− vi(S ∩ T )−∑
j∈S
pqj

+∑
j∈T
pqj


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≥ Ev [fv(q)]−
∑
j∈T
Ev
[
qyv,qj
]
−
∑
i
Ev
[
uv,qi
]− q ∑
j∈M
pqj +
∑
j∈T
pqj
Notice that
∑
j∈T Ev
[
qyv,qj
]
=
∑
j∈T p
q
j from the definition of p
q
j . Furthermore,
∑
i
Ev
[
uv,qi
]
+ q
∑
j∈M
pqj = Ev

uv,qi + q2 ∑
j∈M
yv,qj

 = Ev [fv(q2)]
from the choice of (yv,qj )j∈M and (u
v,q
i )i∈N . We can therefore simplify our inequality to
Ev

∑
i,S
λi,v,qS

vi(S)− vi(S ∩ T )−∑
j∈S
pqj

+∑
j∈T
pqj


≥ Ev [fv(q)]− Ev
[
fv(q2)
]
.
This completes the proof of Claim 4.1.
Claim 4.1 holds for a fixed but arbitrary choice of q ∈ [0, 1]. Our algorithm chooses among all
q = 2−2
X
for X ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ}, where ℓ = log logm, the one that maximizes Ev [fv(q)]−Ev
[
fv(q2)
]
.
Note that by this choice of q, we have
Ev [fv(q)]− Ev
[
fv(q2)
]
≥ 1
ℓ+ 1
ℓ∑
X=0
(
Ev
[
fv(2−2
X
)
]
− Ev
[
fv((2−2
X
)2)
])
=
1
ℓ+ 1
Ev
[(
fv
(
1
2
)
− fv
(
1
m2
))]
.
As we have already established fv
(
1
2
)
≥ 12v(OPT(v)) because one particular choice for λ
would be OPT(v) with probability 12 and the empty allocation otherwise. Furthermore, f
v
(
1
m2
)
≤
1
mv(OPT(v)) because for any λ ∈ Γ( 1m2 ), we have
∑n
i=1
∑
S λ
i
Svi(S) ≤
∑n
i=1
∑
S λ
i
S
∑
j∈S vi({j}) ≤
1
m2
∑
j∈M vi({j}) ≤ 1mv(OPT(v)).
So, these calculations in combination with Claim 4.1 yield that for the value of q chosen by the
algorithm
Ev

∑
i,S
λi,v,qS

vi(S \ T )−∑
j∈S
pqj

+∑
j∈T
pqj


≥ 1
ℓ+ 1
(
1
2
− 1
m
)
Ev [v(OPT(v)] .
Estimating Expectations by Sampling. Our algorithm so far requires to compute expecta-
tions Ev [fv(q)] and p
q
j = Ev˜
[
qyv˜,qj
]
. Given only sample access to the distributions, we will first
estimate the value of Ev [fv(q)] for each q. This is done by repeatedly sampling v and calculating
fv using the linear program (which we can solve using demand oracles). Write fˆ(q) for the resulting
estimate. Assuming that values are scaled to lie in [0, 1], Hoeffding’s inequality guarantees that
for each fixed q with N1 samples Pr
[
|fˆ(q)− Ev [fv(q)]| ≥ δ
]
≤ exp(−2N1δ2). That is, by a union
bound, with probability 1− (ℓ+ 1) exp(−2N1δ2), we have |fˆ(q)−Ev [fv(q)]| < δ for all q = 2−2X ,
where X ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ}.
15
We will then choose q = 2−2
X
to maximize the (estimated) difference fˆ(q)− fˆ(q2). The prices
pqj then satisfy
Ev

∑
i,S
λi,v,qS

vi(S \ T )−∑
j∈S
pqj

+∑
j∈T
pqj


≥ 1
ℓ+ 1
((
1
2
− 1
m
)
Ev [v(OPT(v)] − |fˆ(q)− Ev [fv(q)] | − |fˆ(q2)− Ev
[
fv(q2)
]
|
)
≥ 1
ℓ+ 1
(
1
2
− 1
m
)
Ev [v(OPT(v)] − 2δ.
We next compute prices pˆj that estimate p
q
j by sampling. For every drawn valuation profile v,
we solve the dual linear program corresponding to our choice of q, then take pˆj to be the sample
mean of the observed dual values yv,qj scaled by q. Note that as values are scaled to lie in [0, 1]
also yv,qj ∈ [0, 1] for all v and j. Therefore, Hoeffding’s inequality guarantees that for each fixed j
and fixed X with N2 samples Pr [|pˆj − pqsj| ≥ δ] ≤ exp(−2N2δ2). That is, by a union bound, with
probability 1 − m exp(−2N2δ2), we have |pˆj − pqj | < δ for all j for a fixed q. Conditioning upon
success, we then have
Ev

∑
i,S
λi,v,qS

vi(S \ T )−∑
j∈S
pˆj

+∑
j∈T
pˆj


≥ Ev

∑
i,S
λi,v,qS

vi(S \ T )−∑
j∈S
(pqj + δ)

 +∑
j∈T
(pqj − δ)


≥ Ev

∑
i,S
λi,v,qS

vi(S \ T )−∑
j∈S
pqj

+∑
j∈T
pqj

−mδ −mnδ
≥ 1
ℓ+ 1
(
1
2
− 1
m
)
Ev [v(OPT(v)]− (m+mn+ 2)δ.
Now choose δ = ǫm+mn+2 . The error probability using N1 and N2 samples is upper-bounded by
(ℓ+ 1) exp(−2N1δ2) +m exp(−2N2δ2), so N1 = N2 = 12δ2 ln(2m/ζ) = O(poly(n,m, 1/ǫ, log(1/ζ)))
guarantees it to be at most ζ.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 now follows from Lemma 4.1 in a similar way as Theorem 3.1 followed
from Lemma 3.3 (see Appendix C for details). The advantage of Lemma 4.1 is that it is amenable
to polynomial time computation. If we use prices (pˆj)j∈M , we incur an additive ǫ error for each
item, for each agent. For a total of nmǫ additional additive error. Taking ǫ sufficiently small yields
our desired approximation in polynomial time.
5 An O(log logm) Approximation to Optimal Revenue
We next show how to extend our arguments to obtain a posted-price mechanism that achieves
near-optimal revenue rather than welfare. We will follow the approach of Cai and Zhao [5]. Fix the
valuation distribution D = ∏iDi. We will make an independence assumption on each distribution
Di, which is that the valuations are subadditive over independent items. Roughly speaking, this
means that for any S and T with S ∩ T = ∅, the random variables vi(S) and vi(T ) are distributed
independently. In particular, this implies vi({j}) is distributed independently for each item j. We’ll
write vi(j) = vi({j}) for convenience.
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Theorem 5.1. When buyers have subadditive valuations over independent items, there exists a
simple, deterministic, and DSIC mechanism that achieves an Ω(1/α) approximation to the optimal
BIC revenue where α = O(log logm).
Just like the mechanism of Cai and Zhao [5], our mechanism will be from one of the following
two classes:
1. Rationed sequential posted-price mechanism (RSPM): The buyers are approached in a fixed
order. For each buyer, each item is assigned a static and potentially personalized posted
price. Each buyer can purchase at most a single item at its listed price.
2. Anonymous sequential posted-price with entry fee mechanism (ASPE): Each item is assigned
a static anonymous posted price. The buyers are approached in a fixed order, and each buyer
faces an entry fee that can depend on the set of items that have not yet been sold when they
arrive. If the buyer pays the entry fee, they can purchase any set of items at their posted
prices.
We will write PostRev for the optimal revenue attainable using a RSPM, APostEnRev for
the optimal revenue attainable using an ASPE, and Rev for the optimal BIC revenue.
In Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 we describe the high-level approach of Cai and Zhao [5] and
the key facts of their construction that we will reuse. In Section 5.2 we also state our key lemma,
Lemma 5.6, and show how it implies the improved bound in Theorem 5.1. We prove Lemma 5.6
in Section 5.3.
5.1 A First Core-Tail Decomposition and a Benchmark
In this section we summarize a particular core-tail decomposition due to Cai and Zhao [5]. First
some notation. We’ll use σ to describe an interim allocation rule of mechanism, where σiS(vi) is
the probability that agent i is allocated set S when agent i has valuation vi. We’ll write πij(vi) =∑
S∋j σ
i
S(vi) for the probability that agent i is allocated item j under valuation vi.
Fix personalized item thresholds βij ≥ 0 for all i and j, whose values will be chosen later. We
now describe what is meant by the core. For each buyer i, define a threshold ci as follows:
ci = inf{x ≥ 0:
∑
j
Prvi [vi(j) ≥ βij + x] ≤ 1/2}.
Let Ci(vi) = {j : vi(j) < βij + ci}. That is, Ci(vi) contains all items j for which agent i does not
have too large a value for item j as a singleton, relative to threshold βij .
Fix a mechanism M with interim allocation rule σ. We can now define the core of a mechanism
as follows:
Core(M,β) = Ev

∑
i,S
σiS(vi)vi(S ∩ Ci(vi))

 .
That is, the core with respect to M and β is the total welfare generated by M , excluding any item
j assigned to a buyer i that has too large a value for it, relative to βij .
We can interpret this more explicitly as welfare under a valuation transformation. Define
v′i(S) = vi(S ∩ Ci(vi)). Note that with this definition, omitting the dependence of σ and v′ on
v from the notation, Core(M,β) = E
[∑
i,S σ
i
Sv
′
i(S).
]
An important observation due to Cai and
Zhao [5] is the following:
Lemma 5.1 (Cai and Zhao [5]). Valuations v′ are subadditive over independent items.
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The following lemma summarizes the implications of a construction due to Cai and Zhao [5]
Lemma 5.2 (Cai and Zhao [5]). Fix an arbitrary constant b ∈ (0, 1). Then there exists a mechanism
M with interim allocation rule σ and corresponding item allocation rules π and personalized item
thresholds βij for all i and j such that the following are true:
1. Rev ≤
(
8
1−b + 12
)
· PostRev+ 4 · Core(M,β),
2.
∑n
i=1
ci
2 ≤ 21−b ·PostRev,
3.
∑
k 6=i Prvk [vk(j) ≥ βkj] ≤ b,
4. Evi
[
πij(vi)
]
≤ Prvi [vi(j) ≥ βij ] /b.
From now on we’ll fix b and consider the corresponding mechanism M and thresholds β from
Lemma 5.2, and we’ll simply write Core to mean Core(M,β). Given Lemma 5.2, what remains
in order to prove Theorem 5.1 is to argue that Core can be approximated (up to a factor of
O(log logm)) by either PostRev or APostEnRev.
5.2 The Core Within the Core, Key Lemma, and How it Implies the Bound
The Core as defined above is just the welfare for a specific allocation under transformed but
still subadditive valuation functions (namely the v′i’s). A key idea in the literature on simple,
near-optimal posted price mechanisms for revenue is to turn posted-price mechanisms that achieve
some approximation guarantee for welfare into mechanisms that achieve the same (up to constant
factors) approximation guarantee for revenue by augmenting the mechanism with entry fees. The
idea is that if each buyer’s surplus is sufficiently concentrated, then that surplus can be extracted
as revenue using entry fees. One way to show concentration is to argue that no single item’s
contribution to the surplus is too large (i.e., a Lipschitz condition), but as it turns out individual
items can contribute significantly to surplus under valuations v′i.
Cai and Zhao [5] therefore invoke a second core restriction (called ĈORE in their paper),
resulting in a further restricted valuation vˆi for each agent. This further restricted valuation has a
sufficiently small Lipschitz constant.
To define this second restriction, consider a set of item prices pj (we will fix these later). Then,
for each agent i, define
τi = inf{x :
∑
j
Pr [vi(j) ≥ max{βij , pj + x}] ≤ 1/2}.
Write Yi(vi) = {j : vi(j) < pj + τi}.
With these definitions in place, we can formalize what we meant by a further restriction of
each agent’s valuation vi. Define vˆi(S) = vi(S ∩ Yi(vi)). So vˆ is like v, but with any “very high-
valued individual items” removed from the valuation. Unlike the initial core decomposition, now
the high-valuedness is with respect to prices pj rather than the thresholds βij .
For each agent i, set S, and valuation vi, set µi(vi, S) = maxS′⊆S(vˆi(S′)−
∑
j∈S′ pj). This is the
surplus enjoyed by an agent with valuation vˆi when S is the set of available items, priced according
to pj. (We use the notation µi(vi, S) for consistency with [5]. It’s not related to µT as it appears
in the zero-sum games.)
The following lemmata summarize key properties of the core-within-the-core that are shown in
[5] and that we will re-use in our analysis.
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Lemma 5.3 (Cai and Zhao [5]). For any choice of item prices pj and subadditive functions vi, the
surplus µi is monotone, subadditive, and τi-Lipschitz.
Lemma 5.4 (Cai and Zhao [5]). For any choice of item prices pj and subadditive functions vi,
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈M
max{βij , pj + τi} · Prvi [vi(j) ≥ max{βi,j , pj + τi}] ≤
2
b(1− b) · PostRev.
Lemma 5.5 (Cai and Zhao [5]). For any choice of item prices pj and subadditive functions vi,∑
i τi ≤ 41−b ·PostRev.
The crux and key innovation of our analysis is now the following lemma, which establishes the
existence of an ASPE with an appropriate approximation guarantee.
Our mechanism is actually from the same class of ASPE mechanisms as the mechanism of Cai
and Zhao [5], but uses a different set of item prices. This class of ASPE mechanisms, less call them
median ASPE, is parametrized by a set of of item prices pj and the mechanisms within that class
proceed as follows. The agents are approached sequentially in a fixed order. We write Si(v) for
the set of items still available when agent i is approached. (Note that Si(v) only depends on the
entries of v corresponding to agents that arrived before i.) Agent i faces an entry fee equal to the
median (over randomness in vi) of µi(vi, Si(v)). If agent i pays the entry fee, she can then purchase
any desired subset of items at prices pj .
Lemma 5.6. There is a set of item prices pj such that the median ASPE with these prices achieves
expected revenue at least
APostEnRev ≥ 1
4α
·Core − 1 + 6b
2b(1 − b) ·PostRev.
with α = O(log logm).
Before we prove this lemma let’s first see how it implies the result that we want to prove.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let b ∈ (0, 1) and c > 0 be arbitrary constants. If PostRev ≥ c/α · Core
then by Lemma 5.2,
PostRev ≥ 18
1−b + 12 + 4 · αc
· Rev.
Otherwise, Lemma 5.6 combined with Lemma 5.2 shows that,
APostEnRev ≥
(
1
4α
− 1 + 6b
2b(1− b) ·
c
α
)
·Core ≥
1
4α − 1+6b2b(1−b) · cα(
8
1−b + 12
)
· cα + 4
· Rev.
Now let’s choose c in dependence of b such that
1
8
1−b + 12 + 4 · αc
=
1
4α − 1+6b2b(1−b) · cα(
8
1−b + 12
)
· cα + 4
This gives c(b) = 14 · 2b(1−b)8b−2b2+1 . Then,
max{PostRev,APostEnRev} ≥ 18
1−b + 12 + 4 · αc(b)
·Rev = 1
8
1−b + 12 + 16α · 8b−2b
2+1
2b(1−b)
·Rev.
Choosing, e.g., b = 1/2 we obtain the claim.
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5.3 Proof of Key Lemma, Pricing Beyond Additive Supporting Functions
It remains to show Lemma 5.6, which boils down to finding appropriate item prices. Cai and Zhao
[5] use the “usual” approach of approximating subadditive valuations with XOS valuations [3, 12],
and using this to set item prices. We show how to leverage our novel approach to item pricing to
improve the bound.
5.3.1 Crafting the Item Prices
We would like to find item prices that guide the allocation toward one that approximates the
allocation that defines Core = E
[∑
i,S σ
i
Sv
′
i(S)
]
. To this end we will extend Lemma 3.3 (our
key lemma in the incomplete information case) to allow arbitrary constraints on the marginal
probability of allocating each item to each agent. Given z = {zij}, where each zij is a function
with zij(vi) ∈ [0, 1] for each i, j, and vi, we’ll write
Λ(z) =

{λv}v : Ev−i

∑
S∋j
λi,vS

 ≤ zij(vi) ∀ i, j, vi

 .
That is, Λ(z) is the set of all collection of λv’s satisfying the upper bounds described by z.
Analogous to Lemma 3.3 we can now show the following lemma. The proof follows the proof
of Lemma 3.3 with minor changes. See Appendix D.
Lemma 5.7. For every independent probability distribution D = ∏iDi over subadditive valuation
functions, and zij(vi) ∈ [0, 1] for each i and j and vi, there exist prices pj for j ∈M and probability
distributions λi,v over S ⊆M for all i and v such that λ ∈ Λ(z) and, for all T ⊆M ,
∑
j∈T
pj + Ev

 n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS

v′i(S \ T )−∑
j∈S
pj



 ≥ 1
α
·Ev

 max
λ∈Λ(z)
∑
i,S
λ
i,v
S v
′
i(S)

 ,
where α ∈ O(log logm).
Invoke this lemma with zij(vi) = πij(vi), resulting in some pj and λ. Note then that the RHS
of Lemma 5.7, Ev
[
maxλ∈Λ(z)
∑
i,S λ
i,v
S v
′
i(S)
]
, is at least Core.
We’d now like to claim that if we replace v′i by vˆi in Lemma 5.7, this does not change the welfare
bound by too much.
Lemma 5.8. For any {λv}v ∈ Λ(z) with zij(vi) = πij(vi) and for all T ⊆M ,
Ev
[
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS v
′
i(S \ T )
]
−Ev
[
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS vˆi(S \ T )
]
≤ 2(1 + b)
b(1− b) ·PostRev
Proof. Our goal is to bound, for every i and every fixed vi,
Ev−i
[∑
S
λi,vS v
′
i(S \ T )
]
− Ev−i
[∑
S
λi,vS vˆi(S \ T )
]
= Ev−i
[∑
S
λi,vS
(
v′i(S \ T )− vˆi(S \ T )
)]
.
First, we upper bound v′i(S \T )− vˆi(S \T ) using the definition of vˆi, that vˆi is monotone, and that
v′i is subadditive as follows:
v′i(S \ T )− vˆi(S \ T ) = v′i(S \ T )− vˆi((S \ T ) ∩ Yi(vi)) ≤
∑
j∈S\(T∪Yi(vi))
v′i(j) ≤
∑
j∈S\Yi(vi)
v′i(j).
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Note that j 6∈ Yi(vi) only if vi(j) ≥ pj + τi. Furthermore, v′i(j) ≤ βij + cj for all j. But it may also
happen that vi(j) ≤ βij and hence v′i(j) ≤ βij . This lets us rewrite the above sum to∑
j∈S\Yi(vi)
v′i({j}) ≤
∑
j∈S
(
βij1vi(j)≥pj+τi + cj1vi(j)≥max{pj+τi,βij}
)
.
Therefore, using that {λv}v ∈ Λ(z) with zij(vi) = πij(vi), we have
Ev−i
[∑
S
λi,vS
(
v′i(S \ T )− vˆi(S \ T )
)]
≤ Ev−i

∑
S
λi,vS
∑
j∈S
(
βij1vi(j)≥pj+τi + cj1vi(j)≥max{pj+τi,βij}
)
= Ev−i

∑
j∈M
∑
S∋j
λi,vS
(
βij1vi(j)≥pj+τi + cj1vi(j)≥max{pj+τi,βij}
)
=
∑
j∈M
Ev−i

∑
S∋j
λi,vS

(βij1vi(j)≥pj+τi + cj1vi(j)≥max{pj+τi,βij})
≤
∑
j∈M
πij(vi)
(
βij1vi(j)≥pj+τi + cj1vi(j)≥max{pj+τi,βij}
)
.
Taking the expectation over vi and the sum over all i, we obtain
Ev
[
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS v
′
i(S \ T )
]
− Ev
[
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS vˆi(S \ T )
]
=
n∑
i=1
Ev
[∑
S
λi,vS
(
v′i(S \ T )− vˆi(S \ T )
)]
≤
n∑
i=1
Evi

∑
j∈M
πij(vi)
(
βij1vi(j)≥pj+τi + cj1vi(j)≥max{pj+τi,βij}
) . (7)
It remains to upper bound the RHS of (7) by 2(1+b)b(1−b) · PostRev. Let Ai = {j | βij ≤ pj + τi}.
We first bound
∑n
i=1 Evi
[∑
j∈M π
i
j(vi)βij1vi(j)≥pj+τi
]
:
n∑
i=1
Evi

∑
j∈M
πij(vi)βij1vi(j)≥pj+τi

 ≤ n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ai
βijEvi
[
1vi(j)≥pj+τi
]
+
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6∈Ai
βijEvi
[
πij(vi)
]
=
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ai
βijPrvi [vi(j) ≥ pj + τi] +
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6∈Ai
βijEvi
[
πij(vi)
]
≤
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ai
βijPrvi [vi(j) ≥ pj + τi] +
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6∈Ai
βij
Prvi [vi(j) ≥ βij]
b
≤ 1
b
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈M
max{βij , pj + τi}Pr [vi(j) ≥ max{βij , pj + τi}]
≤ 2
b(1− b) ·PostRev. (8)
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The first inequality uses that both πij(vi) ≤ 1 and 1vi(j)≥pj+τi ≤ 1. The second inequality uses
Lemma 5.2. The third inequality uses the definition of Ai and that bi ∈ (0, 1) and hence 1/b > 1.
The final inequality is Lemma 5.4.
We next bound
∑n
i=1 Evi
[∑
j∈M π
i
j(vi)cj1vi(j)≥max{pj+τi,βij}
]
:
n∑
i=1
Evi

∑
j∈M
πij(vi)cj1vi(j)≥max{pj+τi,βij}

 ≤ n∑
i=1
ci
∑
j∈M
Evi
[
1vi(j)≥max{pj+τi,βij}
]
=
n∑
i=1
ci
∑
j∈M
Prvi [vi(j) ≥ max{pj + τi, βij}]
≤
n∑
i=1
ci
2
≤ 2
1− b ·PostRev. (9)
The first inequality uses that πij(vi) ≤ 1. The second inequality follows from the definition of
τi. The final inequality uses Lemma 5.2.
Combining Inequality (7) with Inequalities (8) and (9) shows the claim.
Similarly to the way we prove Theorem 3.1 from Lemma 3.3 we can now prove:
Lemma 5.9. Using the prices pj that result from invoking Lemma 5.7 with zij(vi) = πij(vi) we
have
n∑
i=1
Ev [µi(vi, Si(v))] ≥ 1
α
Core −Ev

 ∑
j∈SOLD(v)
pj

− 2(1 + b)
b(1− b) ·PostRev.
Proof. Let {λv}v be the collection of distributions corresponding to prices pj . Consider an arbitrary
buyer i and an auxiliary valuation profile v¯. In order to obtain a lower bound on µi when the buyer
has valuation vi, consider drawing a set S from λi,(vi,v¯−i) and buying S \ SOLD(v¯i,v−i) ⊆ Si(v).
We draw v¯ from D and take the expectation over v¯. Since v¯i and v¯−i are independent, this yields
µi(vi, Si(v)) ≥ Ev¯

∑
S
λ
i,(vi,v¯−i)
S

vˆi(S \ SOLD(v¯i,v−i))−∑
j∈S
pj



 .
Next, we take expectations over v on both sides. As v−i and v¯−i are identically and indepen-
dently distributed, we obtain
Ev [µi(vi, Si(v))] ≥ Ev,v¯

∑
S
λ
i,(vi,v¯−i)
S

vˆi(S \ SOLD(v¯i,v−i))−∑
j∈S
pj




= Ev,v¯

∑
S
λ
i,(vi,v−i)
S

vˆi(S \ SOLD(v¯i, v¯−i))−∑
j∈S
pj



 .
Summing this inequality over all buyers i gives
n∑
i=1
Ev [µi(vi, Si(v))] ≥
n∑
i=1
Ev,v¯

∑
S
λi,vS

vˆi(S \ SOLD(v¯))−∑
j∈S
pj



 .
22
Applying Lemma 5.8 with T = SOLD(v¯) and taking an expectation over v¯, we also have
Ev,v¯
[
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS v
′
i(S \ SOLD(v¯))
]
− Ev,v¯
[
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS vˆi(S \ SOLD(v¯))
]
≤ 2(1 + b)
b(1 − b) · PostRev.
So, in combination, by linearity of expectation
n∑
i=1
Ev [µi(vi, Si(v))] ≥
n∑
i=1
Ev,v¯

∑
S
λi,vS

v′i(S \ SOLD(v¯))−∑
j∈S
pj



− 2(1 + b)
b(1− b) ·PostRev.
We now apply Lemma 5.7. It gives us that for any v¯,
Ev

∑
S
λi,vS

v′i(S \ SOLD(v¯))−∑
j∈S
pj



 ≥ 1
α
·CORE −
∑
j∈SOLD(v¯)
pj.
So, in combination, also taking the expectation over v¯ here, we obtain
n∑
i=1
Ev [µi(vi, Si(v))] ≥ 1
α
· CORE− Ev¯

 ∑
j∈SOLD(v¯)
pj

− 2(1 + b)
b(1 − b) · PostRev.
Using the fact that v and v¯ are identically distributed, the claim follows.
5.3.2 Analysis of Entry Fees
We also need the following result from [5] concerning the revenue collected by a median ASPE
through the entry fees, which expliots that the µi are τi-Lipschitz. Recall that we used Si(v) to
denote the set of items that are still available when agent i is approached. Denote the median of
µi(vi, Si(v)) by δi(Si(v)).
Lemma 5.10 (Cai and Zhao [5]). For any choice of item prices pj and subadditive valuations vi,
the expected revenue that the median ASPE that uses these prices collects through the entry fees is
at least
1
4
n∑
i=1
Ev [µi(vi, Si(v))] − 5
8
n∑
i=1
τi.
5.3.3 Putting Everything Together
We are now ready to complete the proof of Lemma 5.6.
Proof of Lemma 5.6. The expected revenue from the posted prices by our median ASPE is, by
definition, Ev
[∑
j∈SOLD(v) pj
]
. Combining this with the lower bound on the expected revenue
collected from the entry fees from Lemma 5.10 yields the following lower bound on the expected
revenue
APostEnRev ≥ 1
4
n∑
i=1
Ev [µi(vi, Si(v))] − 5
8
n∑
i=1
τi + Ev

 ∑
j∈SOLD(v)
pj

 .
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Using Lemma 5.9 to lower bound
∑n
i=1 Ev [µi(vi, Si(v))] and Lemma 5.5 to upper bound
∑n
i=1 τi
we obtain
APostEnRev ≥ 1
4

 1
α
Core − Ev

 ∑
j∈SOLD(v)
pj

− 2(1 + b)
b(1− b) ·PostRev


− 5
8
· 4
1− b · PostRev + Ev

 ∑
j∈SOLD(v)
pj


≥ 1
4α
Core − 1 + 6b
2b(1− b) ·PostRev,
as claimed.
6 Going Beyond O(log logm)
We leave it as an open problem whether the O(log logm) factor could be further reduced, possibly
even to a constant. As a matter of fact, many techniques presented in this paper seem to be very
useful to reach such an improved guarantee. In this section we discuss to what extent they can be
applied and where there are barriers.
In all of our proofs, the O(log logm)-factor originates from variants of the same technical lemma.
In particular, the complete-information proof of Theorem 3.1 as provided in Section 3.1 is mainly
based on Lemma 3.1. Similar lemmas are used for all other proofs as well. This is why we will now
revisit the proof of Lemma 3.1.
The proof of Lemma 3.1 shows that its statement for any value of α is indeed equivalent to
there being a vector of probabilities q = (qj)j∈U , qj ∈ [0, 1], one for each item such that the λ
player has value at least vi(U)/α in the zero-sum game induced by the q vector. More formally,
g(q) ≥ vi(U)/α for the function g(q) = maxλ∈∆(q)minµ∈∆(q)
∑
S,T⊆U λSµTvi(S \ T ), where ∆(q)
denotes all probability distributions ν over sets S ⊆ U such that ∑T∋j νT ≤ qj for all j. This also
means that to show the existence of prices for an o(log logm)-approximation it suffices to show that
there always is a vector q such that g(q) ≥ vi(U)/α for α ∈ o(log logm).
Our proof continues by Lemma 3.2, showing that there exists a q ∈ [0, 1] such that for q =
(q, . . . , q) ∈ [0, 1]|U | we have g(q) ≥ 1αvi(U) for α ∈ O(log logm). That is, we put the same
probability mass q on every item. As we will show now, the O(log logm) bound is indeed tight
for strategies that put the same probability mass q on all items. In other words, for a o(log logm)
bound, one would have to devise a more sophisticated way to choose the q vector.
Theorem 6.1. There exists a subadditive function vi such that for U = M we have
max
q∈[0,1]
g(q) = max
q∈[0,1]
max
λ∈∆(q,...,q)
min
µ∈∆(q,...,q)
∑
S,T⊆M
λSµT vi(S \ T ) ≤ 1
Ω(log logm)
vi(M)
Proof. As we are only interested in an asymptotic bound, we can assume without loss of generality
that m = 22
L
for some L ∈ N. That is, L = log2 log2m. The subadditive function vi will be the
composed of L + 1 subadditive functions v(ℓ) with vi(S) =
∑L
ℓ=0 v
(ℓ)(S) for all S ⊆ M . The idea
is that each of the functions v(ℓ) requires a different value of q so that the λ-player is guaranteed a
good fraction of the value.
The subadditive function will be a judiciously chosen variant of the function that is used to
show the Ω(logm)-separation between XOS and subadditive functions, which is based on the set
cover integrality gap. The basic idea is to stack several such functions that operate on different
subsets of the items on top of each other.
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Construction of Valuation Function. We construct the functions v(ℓ) as follows. Recall that
there are m = 22
L
items in total. Let B(ℓ) = m/(22
ℓ
) = 22
L−2ℓ . We partition all but B(ℓ) items into
disjoint sets of equal size M (ℓ)1 , . . . ,M
(ℓ)
B . So, each of these sets M
(ℓ)
b has size (m − B(ℓ))/B(ℓ) =
22
ℓ − 1. On each of them, we use function fb : M (ℓ)b → R≥0 defined as follows.
Lemma 6.1. Let M ′ be a set of 2k − 1 items for some k ∈ N. There is a subadditive function
f : 2M
′ → R≥0 with the following properties:
1. f({j}) = 1 for all j ∈M ′.
2. f(M ′) ≥ k.
3. For every d ∈ {0, . . . , k}, there is a family of subsets D ⊆ 2M ′ such that for all D ∈ D we
have |D| = 2d−1 and f(M ′ \D) ≤ k−d. Furthermore, each j ∈M ′ is contained in the same
number of sets D ∈ D.
Proof. This function was defined by Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [3], who showed that it is only
poorly approximated by XOS functions. It originates in the worst-case integrality gap for set cover
linear programs (see, e.g, [34, Example 13.4]). We identify the set of items M ′ with binary vectors
Fk2 \ {0}. Consider all binary vectors i ∈ Fk2 \ {0}. Let Si = {j | j · i = 1}. For each set of items
T ⊆M ′ let f(T ) be the minimum number of sets Si required to cover the items in T \ {0}.
The first property now follows from the following fact. Consider any j ∈ Fk2 \ {0}. As j 6= 0,
there has to be some z for which jz = 1. Now, choosing i to be the z-th unit vector, we have
j · i = 1. The second property is shown in [3, Example 4.5]. For the third property, one chooses D
to be the set of all d-dimensional subspaces of Fk2 excluding the all-zero vector. For this choice of
D, the property is verified in [15, Lemma 4.3].
We then define v(ℓ)(S) = 1
B(ℓ)
∑B(ℓ)
b=1
fb(S∩M
(ℓ)
b
)
fb(M
(ℓ)
b
)
.
This construction normalizes each function v(ℓ) to v(ℓ)(M) = 1 and this way vi(M) =
∑L
ℓ=0 v
(ℓ)(M) =
L+1. Note that v is a subadditive function because it is a weighted sum of subadditive functions.
It will be instructive to think of higher ℓ as “more subadditive” in the sense that the respective
v(ℓ) operate on a smaller number of sets M (ℓ)b , each of which consists of more items. So there is
less additivity because there are fewer sets M (ℓ)b , and also less additivity because the respective
functions f (ℓ)b , which are “very subadditive”, operate on larger sets of items.
Bound on Value. Consider some q ∈ [0, 1]. Let ℓ⋆ = ⌈log2 log2 1q ⌉.
We will now construct the distribution µ as follows. Consider any ℓ > ℓ⋆ and b ∈ [B(ℓ)]. Let
x = ℓ− ℓ⋆. Let D(ℓ)b be a set drawn uniformly from the set D as it exists for function f (ℓ)b according
to Lemma 6.1 for d = ⌊2ℓ⋆(2x − cx)⌋, where c = 32 . By this definition, for all j ∈ M
(ℓ)
b , we have
that j ∈ D(ℓ)b with probability
Pr
[
j ∈ D(ℓ)b
]
=
|D(ℓ)b |
|M (ℓ)b |
=
2d − 1
22
ℓ − 1 ≤
2d
22
ℓ
because every item is equally likely to be contained. Furthermore,
2d
22ℓ
≤ 2
2ℓ
⋆
(2x−cx)
22ℓ
=
22
ℓ−2ℓ
⋆
cx
22ℓ
=
(
2−2
ℓ⋆
)cx
≤ qcx ≤ qcx ln q ≤ q
(
1
2
)x
.
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Here, we use that qz−e ln z ≤ q and therefore qz ≤ qze ln q for all z ≥ 1, which we apply for z = cx;
also, by, construction, ce ln q ≤ 12
Now, let T be the union of all these random sets D(ℓ)b for ℓ > ℓ
⋆. By union bound, each item is
contained in T with probability at most q. Therefore, the distribution of T is a feasible choice for
µ.
Our goal is now to bound
∑
S,T⊆M λSµT vi(S \ T ) we split up this sum as follows
∑
S,T⊆M
λSµT vi(S \ T ) =
∑
S,T⊆M
λSµT
L∑
ℓ=0
v(ℓ)(S \ T ) ≤
ℓ⋆∑
ℓ=0
∑
S
λSv
(ℓ)(S) +
L∑
ℓ=ℓ⋆+1
∑
T
µT v
(ℓ)(M \ T ).
Here, we use the bounds v(ℓ)(S \ T ) ≤ v(ℓ)(S) and v(ℓ)(S \ T ) ≤ v(ℓ)(M \ T ).
For ℓ < ℓ⋆, we use subadditivity to get∑
S
λSv
(ℓ)(S) ≤
∑
S
∑
j∈S
λSv
(ℓ)({j}) =
∑
j
v(ℓ)({j})
∑
S:j∈S
λS ≤ q
∑
j
v(ℓ)({j}).
By the construction v(ℓ)({j}) = 1
(m/22ℓ )·2ℓ
≤ 1
2ℓ
if j in included in one of the sets M (ℓ)1 , . . . ,M
(ℓ)
B ,
otherwise v(ℓ)({j}) = 0. Consequently, as 22ℓ ≤ 1q for ℓ < ℓ⋆,
∑
S
λSv
(ℓ)(S) ≤ q
∑
j
v(ℓ)({j}) = q ·m · 1
(m/22ℓ) · 2ℓ ≤
1
2ℓ
.
For ℓ = ℓ⋆, we use that v(ℓ)(S) ≤ 1 for all ℓ. So the total value contributed by all ℓ ≤ ℓ⋆ is
ℓ⋆∑
ℓ=0
∑
S
λSv
(ℓ)(S) ≤ 1 +
∞∑
ℓ=0
1
2ℓ
= 3.
For ℓ > ℓ⋆ a different argument applies. Let x = ℓ − ℓ⋆. Recall the definition v(ℓ)(S) =
1
B(ℓ)
∑B(ℓ)
b=1
fb(S∩M
(ℓ)
b
)
fb(M
(ℓ)
b
)
and also, by definition, (M \ T ) ∩M (ℓ)b ⊆M (ℓ)b \D(ℓ)b . Thus
v(ℓ)(M\T ) = 1
(m/22ℓ) · 2ℓ ·
m
22ℓ
·(2ℓ−d) = 1
2ℓ
(2ℓ−d) = 1
2ℓ
(2ℓ−⌊2ℓ⋆(2x−cx)⌋) ≤ cx2ℓ⋆+ 1
2ℓ
=
(
c
2
)x
+
1
2ℓ
.
This bound holds for all T in the support of µ and so also
∑
T µT v
(ℓ)(M \ T ) ≤ ( c2)x. Finally,
taking the sum over all ℓ from ℓ⋆ + 1 to L, we have
∑
T
µT
L∑
ℓ=ℓ⋆+1
v(ℓ)(M \ T ) ≤
L∑
ℓ=ℓ⋆+1
∑
T
µ
(ℓ)
T v
(ℓ)(M \ T ) ≤
∞∑
x=1
(
c
2
)x
+
∞∑
ℓ=0
1
2ℓ
=
c
2− c + 2.
Combining the bounds from the two cases shows that∑
S,T
λSµSvi(S \ T ) = O(1).
Combined with vi(M) = L+ 1 this shows the claim.
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A Proof of Lemma 3.3
To prove Lemma 3.3 we first follow the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 3.1. That is, we will
capture the condition in a linear program and then use LP duality.
Let γ = 1/α. To show Lemma 3.3 we have to show that for every joint distribution D = ∏ni=1Di
there are prices pj for j ∈ M and distributions λi,v over S ⊆ M for all i and v such that for all
T ⊆M ∑
j∈T
pj + Ev

 n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS

vi(S \ T )−∑
j∈S
pj



 ≥ γEv [v(OPT(v))]
or equivalently
Ev

 n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS
∑
j∈S
pj

−∑
j∈T
pj ≤ Ev
[
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS vi(S \ T )
]
− γEv [v(OPT(v))] . (10)
To reformulate this condition through LP duality, fix distributions λi,v for all i and v, and
consider the following LP with variables pj ≥ 0 for j ∈ M , ℓ+ ≥ 0, and ℓ− ≥ 0 which maximizes
the slack ℓ+− ℓ− that we need to add to the left-hand side of (10) in order to satisfy the inequality
max ℓ+ − ℓ−
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s.t. Ev

 n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS
∑
j∈S
pj

−∑
j∈T
pj + ℓ+ − ℓ−
≤ Ev
[
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS vi(S \ T )
]
− γEv [v(OPT(v))] for all T ⊆M
pj ≥ 0 for all j ∈M
ℓ+ ≥ 0
ℓ− ≥ 0.
The dual LP has variables µT ≥ 0 for every set T ⊆M :
min
∑
T
µT
(
Ev
[
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS vi(S \ T )
]
− γEv [v(OPT(v))]
)
s.t. −
∑
T :T∋j
µT +
∑
T
Ev

 n∑
i=1
∑
S:S∋j
λi,vS

µT ≥ 0 for all j ∈M
∑
T
µT = 1
µT ≥ 0.
We can interpret µ as a distribution over sets of items that puts at most the same probability
mass on each item as the collection of distributions {λv}v. Indeed, by combining the first with the
second constraint we obtain that for all j ∈M :
∑
T :T∋j
µT ≤ Ev

 n∑
i=1
∑
S:S∋j
λi,vS

 .
Now inequality (10) is satisfied if the optimal solution to the primal LP is non-negative, which
by strong duality is the case whenever all feasible solutions to the dual LP have non-negative
value. This, in turn, is true whenever for all µ such that (i)
∑
T µT = 1 and (ii)
∑
T :T∋j µT ≤
Ev
[∑n
i=1
∑
S:S∋j λ
i,v
S
]
for all j, we have
∑
T
µTEv
[
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS vi(S \ T )
]
≥ γEv [v(OPT(v)] .
Now, as in the case of complete information, we’d like to establish this inequality by interpreting
it as a zero-sum game. However, the arguments in Lemma 3.2 for lower-bounding the value of the
zero sum game require the game to be played for a fixed valuation profile. We therefore add an
intermediate step in which we lower bound the value of the zero sum game we are interested in by
the expected value of related zero sum games for fixed valuation profiles.
The zero-sum game we are interested in is the following. Write λv for {λi,v}ni=1. For q ∈ [0, 1]
let Λ(q) = {{νv}v | Ev
[∑n
i=1
∑
S:S∋j ν
i,v
S
]
≤ q}. Let ∆(q, . . . , q) be defined as in the complete
information case. We want to show
g(q) = sup
{λv}v∈Λ(q)
inf
µ∈∆(q,...,q)
∑
T
µTEv
[
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS vi(S \ T )
]
≥ γEv [v(OPT(v))] .
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To show this consider the following class of zero-sum games, which have the same basic structure,
but instead of considering the payoff in expectation over valuation profiles the payoffs are now for
a given and fixed valuation profile v. For q ∈ [0, 1] let Γ(q) = {{νi}ni=1 |
∑n
i=1
∑
S:S∋j ν
i
S ≤
q for all j in M}. Define
gv(q) = sup
λ∈Γ(q)
inf
µ∈∆(q,...,q)
∑
T
µT
(
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λiSvi(S \ T )
)
.
Now consider the definition of g(q). If we swap the infimum and the expectation we only give
the µ-player more power. Hence for any q,
g(q) = sup
{λv}v∈Λ(q)
inf
µ∈∆(q,...,q)
∑
T
µTEv
[
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS vi(S \ T )
]
≥ sup
{λv}v∈Λ(q)
Ev
[
inf
µ∈∆(q,...,q)
∑
T
µT
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS vi(S \ T )
]
= Ev
[
sup
λ∈Γ(q)
inf
µ∈∆(q,...,q)
∑
T
µT
(
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λiSvi(S \ T )
)]
= Ev [g
v(q)]
So in order to establish the existence of a q for which g(q) ≥ γEv [v(OPT(v))] it suffices to
show that there is a q for which Ev [gv(q)] ≥ γEv [v(OPT(v))].
Lemma A.1. There exists a q ∈ [0, 1] such that
Ev [g
v(q)] ≥ 1
α
v(OPT(v)).
In order to prove Lemma A.1 we will basically proceed as in the proof of Lemma 3.2. However,
in order to show that there is a single q that works for Ev [gv(q)] it will be useful to separate out
the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma A.2. For every v and ℓ = log logm
1
ℓ+ 1
ℓ∑
i=0
gv
(
2−2
i
)
≥ 1
ℓ+ 1
·
(
1
2
− 1
m
)
· v(OPT(v)).
Proof of Lemma A.2. As in the proof of Lemma 3.2 our strategy will be to derive a lower bound
on gv(q) in terms of an appropriately chosen f -function. The f -function we will use is
fv(q) = sup
λ∈Γ(q)
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λiSvi(S).
We first use that for any of the involved valuation functions vi and any two sets S and T
subadditivity implies that vi(S \ T ) ≥ vi(S) − vi(S ∩ T ) to derive the following lower bound on
gv(q):
gv(q) = sup
λ∈Γ(q)
inf
µ∈∆((q,...,q))
∑
T
µT
(
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λiSvi(S \ T )
)
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≥ sup
λ∈Γ(q)
inf
µ∈∆((q,...,q))
∑
T
µT
(
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λiS
(
vi(S)− vi(S ∩ T )
))
.
We can now regroup the right-hand side by splitting into two summations (one over vi(S) and the
other over vi(S ∩ T )), use that ∑T µT = 1 to simplify, and then pull the infimum over the first of
the two summations and the minus sign:
gv(q) ≥ sup
λ∈Γ(q)
inf
µ∈∆((q,...,q))
(∑
T
µT
(
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λiSvi(S)
)
−
∑
T
µT
(
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λiSvi(S ∩ T )
))
= sup
λ∈Γ(q)
inf
µ∈∆((q,...,q))
(
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λiSvi(S)−
∑
T
µT
(
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λiSvi(S ∩ T )
))
= sup
λ∈Γ(q)
(
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λiSvi(S)− sup
µ∈∆((q,...,q))
∑
T
µT
(
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λiSvi(S ∩ T )
))
.
We next interpret λiS · µT as a probability distribution over sets S ∩ T . The probability mass
that this distribution puts on each item is at most q2. We can thus lower bound the right-hand
side in the previous equation and hence gv(q) as follows:
gv(q) ≥ sup
λ∈Γ(q)
(
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λiSvi(S)− sup
ν∈Γ(q2)
(
n∑
i=1
∑
S
νiSvi(S)
))
= fv(q)− fv(q2).
For any ℓ we thus have,
ℓ∑
i=0
gv
(
2−2
i
)
≥
ℓ∑
i=0
(
fv
(
2−2
i
)
− fv
(
2−2
i+1
))
= fv
(
2−1
)
− fv
(
2−2
ℓ+1
)
,
by a telescoping sum argument.
Moreover, for ℓ = log logm,
2−2
ℓ+1
= 2−2 logm =
1
m2
.
So for ℓ = log logm,
ℓ∑
i=0
gv
(
2−2
i
)
≥ fv
(
1
2
)
− fv
(
1
m2
)
.
We next derive a lower bound on fv(1/2) and an upper bound of fv(1/m2). For the lower bound
on fv(1/2) observe that one possible choice for λi for i = 1, . . . , n would be to choose OPTi(v)
with probability 1/2. Hence
fv
(
1
2
)
≥ 1
2
· v(OPT(v)).
On the other hand, we can derive an upper bound on fv(1/m2) from the (very crude) upper
bound vi(S) ≤ v(OPT(v)) for all i. Namely,
fv
(
1
m2
)
= sup
λ∈Γ
(
1
m2
)
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λiSvi(S)
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≤ sup
λ∈Γ
(
1
m2
)

 n∑
i=1
∑
S 6=∅
λiS

 · v(OPT(v))
≤ m · 1
m2
· v(OPT(v))
=
1
m
· v(OPT(v)).
We conclude that
1
ℓ+ 1
ℓ∑
i=0
g(2−2
i
) ≥ 1
ℓ+ 1
·
(
1
2
− 1
m
)
· v(OPT(v)),
as claimed.
It remains to show Lemma A.1.
Proof of Lemma A.1. Let ℓ = log logm. Taking expectations over v on both sides of Lemma A.2
shows that for j drawn uniformly from {0} ∪ [ℓ] and qj = 2−2j ,
Ev,j [g
v (qj)] ≥ 1
ℓ+ 1
·
(
1
2
− 1
m
)
· Ev [v(OPT(v))] .
Because this inequality holds in expectation over j drawn uniformly from {0} ∪ [ℓ] there must be
a j for which
Ev [g
v (qj)] ≥ 1
ℓ+ 1
·
(
1
2
− 1
m
)
· Ev [v(OPT(v))] ,
as claimed.
B Proof of Theorem 3.1 (incomplete information)
Let OPT(v) denote the welfare-maximizing allocation given valuations v and let ALG(v) denote
the allocation of the posted-price mechanism that uses the prices pj for j ∈ M whose existence is
established in Lemma 3.3.
For the lower bound on the utilities consider an arbitrary buyer i. For any valuation profiles v
and v′, buyer i with valuation vi can consider drawing a set S from λ
i,(vi,v
′
−i
) and buy whatever
is left from S. Clearly, for any vi, the set of items sold on valuation profile v before buyer i is a
subset of SOLD(v′i,v−i) which is what would be sold on valuation profile (v
′
i,v−i). Since this holds
for any v′ it also holds in expectation when v′ drawn from D, fixing v. So, since v′i and v′−i are
independent,
ui((vi,v−i),p) ≥ Ev′

∑
S
λ
i,(vi,v
′
−i
)
S

vi(S \ SOLD(v′i,v−i))−∑
j∈S
pj



 .
We can now take expectations over v on both sides and exploit that v−i and v′−i are identically
and independently distributed to obtain
Ev [ui((vi,v−i),p)] ≥ Ev,v′

∑
S
λ
i,(vi,v
′
−i
)
S

vi(S \ SOLD(v′i,v−i))−∑
j∈S
pj




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= Ev,v′

∑
S
λ
i,(vi,v−i)
S

vi(S \ SOLD(v′i,v′−i))−∑
j∈S
pj



 .
Summing this inequality over all buyers i gives
n∑
i=1
Ev [ui((vi,v−i),p)] ≥
n∑
i=1
Ev,v′

∑
S
λi,vS

vi(S \ SOLD(v′))−∑
j∈S
pj



 .
Since Lemma 3.3 holds pointwise for any T that is consistent across buyers, it also applies
in expectation if we draw v′ from D and set T = SOLD(v′). Combining this with the previous
inequality we obtain
n∑
i=1
Ev [ui((vi,v−i),p)] ≥ 1
α
Ev [OPT(v)] − Ev′

 ∑
j∈SOLD(v′)
pj

 . (11)
For the revenue we have
Ev∼D [r(v,p)] = Ev∼D

 ∑
j∈SOLD(v)
pj

 . (12)
Adding (12) to (11) shows the claim.
C Proof of Theorem 4.1
We use OPT(v) to denote the welfare-maximizing allocation given valuations v and ALG(v) to
denote the allocation of the posted-price mechanism that uses the prices pj for j ∈ M whose
existence is established in Lemma 4.1.
For the lower bound on the utilities consider an arbitrary buyer i. For any valuation profiles v
and v′, buyer i with valuation vi can consider drawing a set S from λ
i,(vi,v
′
−i
) and buy whatever
is left from S. Clearly, for any vi, the set of items sold on valuation profile v before buyer i is a
subset of SOLD(v′i,v−i) which is what would be sold on valuation profile (v
′
i,v−i). Since this holds
for any v′ it also holds in expectation when v′ drawn from D, fixing v. So, since v′i and v′−i are
independent,
ui((vi,v−i),p) ≥ Ev′

∑
S
λ
i,(vi,v′−i)
S

vi(S \ SOLD(v′i,v−i))−∑
j∈S
pj



 .
We can now take expectations over v on both sides and exploit that v−i and v′−i are identically
and independently distributed to obtain
Ev [ui((vi,v−i),p)] ≥ Ev,v′

∑
S
λ
i,(vi,v
′
−i
)
S

vi(S \ SOLD(v′i,v−i))−∑
j∈S
pj




= Ev,v′

∑
S
λ
i,(vi,v−i)
S

vi(S \ SOLD(v′i,v′−i))−∑
j∈S
pj



 .
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Summing this inequality over all buyers i gives
n∑
i=1
Ev [ui((vi,v−i),p)] ≥
n∑
i=1
Ev,v′

∑
S
λi,vS

vi(S \ SOLD(v′))−∑
j∈S
pj



 .
Since Lemma 4.1 holds pointwise for any T that is consistent across buyers, it also applies
in expectation if we draw v′ from D and set T = SOLD(v′). Combining this with the previous
inequality we obtain
n∑
i=1
Ev [ui((vi,v−i),p)] ≥ 1
α
Ev [OPT(v)]− Ev′

 ∑
j∈SOLD(v′)
pj

− ǫ. (13)
For the revenue we have
Ev∼D [r(v,p)] = Ev∼D

 ∑
j∈SOLD(v)
pj

 . (14)
Adding (14) to (13) shows the claim.
D Proof of Lemma 5.7
The following is a sketch. The proof will follow the proof of Lemma 3.3 with minor changes. For
convenience, write OPTz = Ev
[
maxλ∈Λ(z)
∑
i,S λ
i,v
S v
′
i(S)
]
First, when considering the LP with variables pj, ℓ+, and ℓ−, we replace instances of Ev [v(OPT(v))]
with OPTz, and similarly for the dual LP. Then just as in Lemma 3.3, it suffices to show that there
is some choice of λ ∈ Λ(z) such that, for all µ such that (i) ∑T µT = 1 and (ii) ∑T∋j µT ≤
Ev
[∑
i
∑
S∋j λ
i,v
S
]
, we have
∑
T
µTEv

∑
i,S
λi,vS v
′
i(S\T )

 ≥ γOPTz.
We establish this using a zero-sum game. Write zj(vi) =
∑
i zij(vi). Fix v, and for q ∈ [0, 1], let
Γ(q) = {ν | ∑i∑S∋j νiS ≤ q · zj(vi) for all j ∈M }. Under this definition of Γ(q), we define gv(q)
in the same way as in Lemma 3.3 except that we replace vi with v′i. I.e.,
gv(q) = sup
λ∈Γ(q)
inf
µ∈∆((q,...,q))
∑
T
µT
(
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λiSv
′
i(S \ T )
)
.
We then define Λ(q) in the same way as Λ(z), but with the right-hand side of all inequalities
multiplied by q. I.e.,
Λ(q) =

{λv}v : Ev−i

∑
S∋j
λi,vS

 ≤ qzij(vi) ∀ i, j, vi


We use this definition of Λ(q) to define g(q), again replacing vi with v′i:
g(q) = sup
{λv}v∈Λ(q)
inf
µ∈∆(q,...,q)
∑
T
µTEv
[
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λi,vS v
′
i(S \ T )
]
.
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Then precisely as in Lemma 3.3, we have that g(q) ≥ Ev [gv(q)].
The last step is to show that there is a choice of q for which Ev [gv(q)] ≥ γOPTz. This follows
by a telescoping argument as before. The key observation is that if λ ∈ Γ(q) and µ ∈ ∆(q), then
the distribution over S ∩ T , where S ∼ λ and T ∼ µ, is in Γ(q2).
Defining fv with respect to Γ(q) and v′, i.e,
fv(q) = sup
λ∈Γ(q)
n∑
i=1
∑
S
λiSv
′
i(S).
we end up with a bound in terms of (fv(1/2) − fv(1/m2)). We have that fv(1/2) ≥ (1/2)OPTz
in the same way as before. We also have fv(1/m2) ≤ (1/m)OPTz, using the crude upper bound
that each individual agent’s contribution to the welfare under Λ(z) is at most OPTz. Our analysis
of the telescoping sum therefore follows in the same way as Lemma 3.3, and the result follows.
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